A distributed system is no longer confined to a single administrative domain. Peer-to-peer applications and business-to-business e-commerce systems, for example, typically span multiple local-area and wide-area networks, raising issues of trust, security, and anonymity. This paper introduces a distributed systems model with an explicit notion of domain that defines the scope of trust and local communication within a system. We introduce leader-election oracles that distinguish between common and distinct domains, encapsulating failure-detection information and leading to modular solutions and proofs. We show how Reliable Broadcast can be implemented in our domain-based model, we analyze the cost of communicating across groups, and we establish lower-bounds on the number of cross-domain messages necessary to implement Reliable Broadcast.
Introduction

Motivation
Distributed systems are no longer confined to a single administrative domain. For example, peerto-peer applications and business-to-business e-commerce systems typically span multiple localarea and wide-area networks. In addition, these systems commonly span multiple organizations, which means that issues of trust, security, and anonymity have to be addressed. Such global environments present new challenges to the way we program and organize distributed systems.
At the programming level, several researchers have recently proposed constructs to decompose a global system into smaller units that define boundaries of trust and capture locality. An example of such a construct is the notion of ambient introduced by Cardelli [Car99b] . The trend reflects a growing realization that one should not treat a global system as a very large local-area network.
The Domain-Based Model
We introduce a distributed systems model with an explicit notion of domain that defines the scope of trust and local communication within a system. A domain is a set of processes, and a system is a set of domains. A domain-based model allows us to employ novel complexity measures, such as the number of times a given algorithm communicates across domain boundaries. Such complexity measures reflect the real-world costs of crossing firewalls and communicating along wide-area links. In contrast, a conventional "flat" model, with a single set of processes, attributes the same cost to any point-to-point communication. Besides complexity measures, a domain-based model also allows us to capture the realistic notion that failure information within a local-area network is more accurate than failure information obtained across wide-area networks. We develop a notion of leader-election oracle that provides one level of information to processes within the same domain, and another, with weaker properties, to processes in other domains. Finally, domains enable us to reflect the common security policy that a process trusts other processes in the same organization (domain), but not necessarily processes in other domains. We introduce Byzantine failures into our model, and having domains allows us to attribute Byzantine behavior to entire domains (as seen from the outside).
Domain-Based Algorithms
In building global systems, a fundamental concern is the reliable dissemination of information. We want the information dissemination to be reliable, but also efficient and scalable. In practice, an important aspect of efficiency is the amount of wide-area bandwidth consumed by information dissemination algorithms. In terms of scalability, an important quality is to make the system decentralized. To address the issue of information dissemination in large-scale systems, we describe a number of Reliable Broadcast algorithms that work in our domain-based model.
The first set of algorithms tolerate crash failures only. In this context, we start by examining how to implement Reliable Broadcast in a purely asynchronous, domain-based model. We then incrementally add synchrony assumptions to this model, and show how one can exploit these assumptions, in the form of leader-election oracles, to reduce the number of messages that cross domain boundaries. We analyze the cost of these algorithms in terms of cross-domain messages and present lower bounds that quantify the inherent cost of reliability in a domain-based model.
The second set of algorithms implement Reliable Broadcast in a system with Byzantine failures. We consider a domain to be Byzantine if it contains a Byzantine process, and we develop algorithms that can tolerate Byzantine domains. Considering Byzantine behavior at the domain level reflects the notion that a domain is the unit of trust and security: once a domain has been compromised, it is likely that an adversary can take over as many processes as it wishes within that domain. We first provide a protocol that ensures agreement: all correct processes in all non-Byzantine domains deliver the same set of messages. We then give an algorithm that also ensures consistency: messages are tagged with unique identifiers, and no two correct processes in non-Byzantine domains deliver different messages with the same identifier. Consistency is an important property. It prevents spurious messages from being delivered, which may happen, for example, if an erroneous sender keeps using the same message identifier with different message contents.
Related Work
Compared with the ambient calculus [Car99a] , and other wide-area models based on process algebras, our system model explicitly captures failures and the availability of failure information.
A number of papers have addressed the issue of information dissemination with Reliable Broadcast. The algorithms in [HT93] use message diffusion, and tolerate crash and link failures. In [CT90] , the authors present time and message efficient Reliable Broadcast algorithms that tolerate crash and omission failures. The protocol in [GS96] exploits failure detection to more efficiently diffuse messages. All these protocols assume a flat universe of processes. If we were to employ them on top of a networking infrastructure with wide-area networks, the resulting wide-area message complexity would be proportional to the total number of processes. With our protocols, the wide-area message complexity is proportional to the number of domains (assuming that there are no wide-area links within a domain).
The Reliable Broadcast algorithm in [Rei94] assumes a flat model with Byzantine processes. In our terminology, the algorithm implements agreement but not consistency-there is no notion of message identifiers to ensure that processes deliver the same message content for the same identifier. The notion of Byzantine Agreement [PSL80, LSP82] captures a variation of Reliable Broadcast in the Byzantine model. With Byzantine Agreement, a single process broadcasts a value, and all correct processes must decide on the same value. The original formulation of the problem in [PSL80] requires an explicit notion of time. The definition of Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement [BT85] does not use time and only requires honest processes to decide if the broadcasting process is honest. Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement ensures consistency relative to a single message, but the definition of the problem is for a single message. Thus, besides implementing Byzantine-tolerant Reliable Broadcast in a domain-based model, our algorithms also bridge the gap between Reliable Broadcast and Byzantine Agreement.
Summary of Contributions
The paper makes the following contributions:
• We define a domain-based system model, which corresponds to current wide-area distributed systems, and give a specification of Reliable Broadcast in this model.
• We introduce leader-election oracles that distinguish between common and distinct domains, encapsulate failure-detection information, and lead to modular solutions and proofs.
• We show how Reliable Broadcast can be implemented in our domain-based model. We start with the simple case of only two groups and then build up to more complex cases.
• We analyze the cost of communicating across groups, evaluate the performance of our protocols in terms of cross-domain messages, and provide lower-bounds on the number of cross-domain messages necessary to implement Reliable Broadcast.
2 System Model and Definitions
Processes, Failures and Communication
We assume that the system is composed of groups of processes, that is, Π = {Π 1 , Π 2 , ..., Π n }, where Π x = {p 1 , p 2 , ..., p nx }. When we need to distinguish processes from different groups, we will use superscripts: p x i ∈ Π x . Processes may be honest (i.e., they execute according to their protocols) or malicious (i.e., Byzantine). Honest processes can crash, but before they crash, they follow their protocols.
A process that is honest and does not crash is correct; if the process is honest but crashes it is faulty. If a group has at least one malicious process, then it is bad ; otherwise the group is good. Therefore, good groups can contain only correct and faulty processes, while bad groups can contain any kind of processes. In a good group Π x , we assume that at most f x < n x processes crash.
Processes communicate by message passing. Each message m has three fields: sender(m), the process where m originated, id(m), a unique identifier associated with m, and val(m), the actual contents of m. We assume that the network is fully connected, and each link is reliable. A reliable link guarantees that (a) if p i sends a message m to p j , and both p i are p j are correct, then p j eventually receives m; (b) each message is received at most once by honest processes; and (c) if an honest process receives a message m, and if sender(m) is honest, then m was sent.
The system is asynchronous: message-delivery times are un-bounded, as is the time it takes for a process to execute steps of its local algorithm. We assume the existence of a discrete global clock, although processes do not have access to it-the global clock is used only to simplify some definitions. We take the range T of the clock's ticks to be the set of natural numbers.
Domain-Based Reliable Broadcast
The domain-based Reliable Broadcast abstraction is defined by the primitives byz-broadcast(m) and byz-deliver(m), and has the following properties:
• (Validity.) If a correct process in a good group byz-broadcasts m, then it byz-delivers m.
• (Agreement.) If a correct process in a good group byz-delivers m, then each correct process in every good group also byz-delivers m.
• (Integrity.) Each honest process byz-delivers every message at most once. Moreover, if sender(m) is honest, then sender(m) byz-broadcast m.
• (Consistency.) Let p i and p j be two processes in good groups. If p i byz-delivers m, p j byz-delivers m , and
Domain-based Reliable Broadcast without consistency is a generalization of Reliable Broadcast in a flat model. Throughout the paper, we use Reliable Broadcast locally in groups as a building block to implement domain-based Reliable Broadcast. We refer to such an abstraction as local Reliable Broadcast. Local Reliable Broadcast is defined by the primitives r-broadcast(m) and r-deliver(m). The properties of local Reliable Broadcast can be obtained from the properties of domain-based Reliable Broadcast by replacing byz-broadcast(m) and byz-deliver(m) by r-broadcast(m) and r-deliver(m), and considering a system composed of one good group only. Without the consistency property, local Reliable Broadcast can implemented with a conventional "flat" algorithm [CT96] . When the consistency property is needed, such as in our most general algorithm in Section 5.2, the implementation is different from Reliable Broadcast implementations in the flat model. We discuss such an implementation further in Section 5.2.
Leader-Election Oracles
In some of our algorithms we use oracles that give hints about process crashes-they do not provide any information about which processes are malicious. Our oracles are quite similar to the Ω failure detector in [CHT96] . Where Ω is defined for a "flat" system, our oracles are defined for a distributed system with groups.
We introduce a notion of group oracle-an oracle that gives information about the processes in a particular group. For example, the group oracle Ω x gives information about the processes in Π x . Thus, our system contains a set of oracles, {Ω 1 , Ω 2 , . . . , Ω n }, one per group. Each process has access to all oracles. Having an oracle per group, rather than a single "global" oracle, allows us to distinguish between local information and remote information. A process p x i gets local information from the oracle Ω x (information about other processes in Π x ). In contrast, a process p x i obtains remote information from an oracle Ω y , where y = x (information about processes in other groups). We use the notion of group oracle to model a system where local information is stronger than remote information.
We use the set G to denote the set of all processes in the system (G = Π 1 ∪ Π 2 ∪ . . . ∪ Π n ). Moreover, we use the set good to denote the set of good groups (good ⊆ Π).
In the following, we adapt the model in [CHT96] to define a notion of group oracle. A failure pattern represents a run of the system. A failure pattern F captures which processes in G crash, and when they crash. Formally speaking, a failure pattern is a map from time to a subset of G. Based on a failure pattern F , we can define the set of processes that crash in F as crash(F ):
where F is the set of all failure patterns, and F is an element of this set. For a good group Π x , the set correct x (F ) is the set of correct processes in Π x . A group-oracle history H x is a map from process-time pairs to a process in Π x . 1 A pair (q, t) maps to the process p x i if the process q at time t believes that p x i has not crashed. We also say that q trusts p x i at time t. Intuitively, a failure pattern is what actually happens in a run, and a group-oracle history represents the output from a group oracle. We can now define a group oracle Ω x as a map from a failure pattern to a set of group-oracle histories:
The set H x is the set of all group-oracle histories relative to a group Π x , and the history H x is an element in this set. Furthermore, the set D x is the set of all oracles for Π x , and Ω x is an element in this set (in other words, Ω x is an oracle).
We can use the above definitions to establish constraints on the information that an oracle Ω x gives a process p. First of all, if Π x is a bad group, there are no constraints-Ω x may return arbitrary information. If Π x is a good group, there are two sets of constraints: a set of constraints for local information (p ∈ Π x ) and remote information (p ∈ Π x ):
• Local Trust: For any good group Π x , eventually all correct processes in Π x trust the same correct process in Π x . Formally:
• Remote Trust: For any good group Π x , eventually, all correct processes in all good groups trust a correct process in Π x . Formally:
• Stability: For any good group Π x , eventually, any correct process in a good group trusts the same process in Π x forever. Formally:
Roughly speaking, a group oracle Ω x is equivalent to the oracle Ω in [CHT96] in terms of local information-we use a group oracle Ω x for leader election within the group Π x . In terms of remote information, Ω x provides slightly weaker information-the processes in a group Π y use the oracle Ω x to select a process in Π x that serves as destination for inter-group messages that are sent from Π y . The Remote Trust and Stability properties ensure that any process in a remote group eventually trust a single process in Π x . However, different processes in remote groups may trust different processes in Π x . If instead the oracle Ω x guaranteed to eventually return the same process in Π x to any process (local and remote), this "leader" could become a bottleneck since it would handle all incoming and outgoing communication in Π x .
Abstractions for Solving Reliable Broadcast
It is possible to implement domain-based Reliable Broadcast in a purely asynchronous system. However, one can come up with more efficient algorithms in a model with oracles. We want to provide insights about both types of algorithms: algorithms that assume a purely asynchronous model and algorithms that use the oracles introduced in Section 2.3. It turns out that both types of algorithms share a common principle: for each broadcast message, at least one correct process in the sending group communicates the message to a correct process in the receiving group. The choice of underlying model does not change this principle, only how it is achieved. Rather than describe a number of algorithms that are identical except for their dealing with the underlying model, we encapsulate model-related concerns in well-defined abstractions. The use of these abstractions allows us to simplify the description of our algorithms and to modularize the proof of their correctness. Our abstractions are specified relative to a given group. Rather than explicitly pass a group as parameter to every invocation, we supply the group as a subscript of the abstraction. For example, the abstraction senders x () means "the senders abstraction relative to a group Π x ."
The senders x () abstraction. This abstraction is used within a group Π x to select the processes in Π x that send messages to processes in other groups. The senders x () abstraction returns a set of processes in Π x . If p x i in Π x invokes senders x () and the returned set includes p x j , we say that
The senders x () abstraction has the following properties:
• Termination: The senders x () abstraction is non-blocking.
• Validity: Eventually, senders x () selects a correct process in Π x .
• Agreement: Eventually, any invocation of senders x () selects the same processes.
Notice that the senders x () abstraction is only available to processes in the group Π x . Notice also that the set of processes returned by senders x () may change over time.
The destinations x () abstraction. Processes in a group Π y can use the destinations x () abstraction to select the recipients in Π x of inter-group messages. That is, processes in Π y use destinations x () to determine which processes in Π x to send messages to. If a process in Π y , p y i , invokes destinations x (), and if the returned set includes a process p x j , we say that p y i selects p x j . The destinations x () abstraction has the following properties:
• Termination: The destinations x () abstraction is non-blocking.
• Validity: Eventually, destinations x () selects a correct process in Π x .
• Agreement: For any process p, eventually any invocation of destinations x () by p selects the same processes.
Notice that destinations x () is a global abstraction-any process in any group can invoke this abstraction under the above guarantees. Although the properties of destinations x () and senders x () are quite similar, the Agreement properties are different. For senders x (), the Agreement property ensures that all processes in Π x eventually select the same set of senders. For destinations x (), the Agreement property only ensures that any individual process "stabilizes" on the same set of destinations, different processes may stabilize on different sets of destinations. The weaker Agreement property for destinations x () implies that processes within Π x can share the load: the abstractions do not insist that only a single process receives all messages in Π x .
Implementing the senders x () and destinations x () abstractions. In an asynchronous model, we can implement the abstractions by returning a subset of Π x that contains at least f x + 1 processes (such a set will contain at least one correct process). In a model with oracles, we can implement the abstractions by simply returning the single process output from the oracle. We show these implementations in Table 1 .
return Ω x Table 1 : Implementation of the abstractions with or without oracles
In the asynchronous implementation, we return the same set of processes in both abstractions. However, there is no requirement to do so: the implementation of senders x () could return one subset of size f x + 1 and the implementation of destinations x () could return another. Moreover, although the oracle-based implementation of senders x () is identical to the implementation of destinations x (), the abstractions still provide different agreement properties: senders x () is only called by processes in Π x , and the oracle gives stronger guarantees to processes within Π x .
The send x () and receive x () abstractions. The send x () and receive x () abstractions capture reliable communication between groups. The send x () abstraction takes a message as argument, and the receive x () abstraction returns a message. The two abstractions have the following properties:
• Termination: The send x () abstraction is non-blocking.
• Validity: If a correct process in Π y invokes send x () with a message m then eventually a correct process in Π x can receive m by invoking receive x ().
• Integrity: If receive x () returns a message m to an honest process p, and if sender(m) is honest, then sender(m) called send x () with m.
Unlike a traditional message-sending operation, send x () takes a group, not a process, as the message destination-we use a subscript to designate the group. The send x () abstraction encapsulates the concern of sending to a correct process. This is in contrast to destinations x (), which simply ensures that some correct process is selected. We can implement send x () with regular point-to-point communication primitives and the destinations x () abstraction previously introduced (see Algorithm 1).
A Special Case: Two Good Groups
The Algorithm
We examine how to implement domain-based Reliable Broadcast. For simplicity, we restrict our scope to systems with only two good groups-our algorithm tolerates crash failures only. We introduce algorithms that work for any number of groups and tolerate malicious processes in Section 5. Throughout this section, we consider two good groups, Π x and Π y , and assume that messages originate in Π x . We are interested in algorithms that are judicious about the number of inter-group messages used to deliver a broadcast message in both groups. We present a generic algorithm that relies on the abstractions in Section 3. By instantiating the abstractions in different ways (with or without using oracles), we achieve solutions for different models.
Algorithm 2 has four when clauses, but only one executes at a time. Whenever one of the when conditions evaluates true, the clause is executed until the end. If more than one condition evaluates true at the same time, one clause is arbitrarily chosen. for all m ∈ mset \ rcvM sgs do byz-deliver(m) byz-deliver(m)
Algorithm Assessment
Because Algorithm 2 only relies on the specification of our abstractions, and not on their implementation, it is possible to mix and match abstractions with different implementations. For example, it is possible to combine an oracle-based implementation of senders() with an asynchronous implementation of destinations(). Such a combination would exploit synchrony assumptions within groups but not across groups.
The various combinations of abstraction implementations give rise to different costs in intergroup messages for the resulting Reliable Broadcast algorithm. If we use the asynchronous implementation of both abstractions in Algorithm 2, we achieve a performance of (f x +1)(f y +1) inter-group messages per broadcast.
If we combine the asynchronous implementation of destinations y () with an oracle-based implementation of senders x (), we obtain a domain-based Reliable Broadcast algorithm with a best-case message cost of f y + 1. The algorithm may have a higher message cost for arbitrary periods of time, but the properties of Ω x ensure that eventually only a single process in Π x will be selected. Thus, eventually only a single process will send inter-group messages. Moreover, with the asynchronous implementation of destinations y (), the number of destinations is constant (i.e., f y + 1), and so is the number of messages sent by each selected sender.
If instead we combine the asynchronous implementation of senders x () with an oracle-based implementation of destinations y (), we obtain a domain-based Reliable Broadcast algorithm with best-case message cost of f x + 1. With an asynchronous implementation of senders x (), there will always be f x + 1 senders. Due to the stability property of the oracle Ω y , each of the f x + 1 senders will eventually trust a correct process in Π y forever. Thus, at any of the f x + 1 senders there is a time t after which destinations y () returns the same process forever. This means that after t, the watch task in Algorithm 1 does not send any messages. Thus, after t, each broadcast message results in each of the f x + 1 senders sending exactly one inter-group message. Notice that the senders do not necessarily send to the same process in Π y .
Finally, if we combine the oracle-based implementation of senders x () with the oracle-based implementation of destinations y (), the resulting Reliable Broadcast algorithm will have best case of 1 inter-group message per broadcast. As we discussed above, there is a time after which the oracle Ω x results in the selection of the single sender in Π x . Furthermore, there is a time after which the Ω y oracle returns the same destination forever to each sender. In combination, the two oracles ensure that, eventually, each broadcast message results in only a single process in Π x sending a single message to a single process in Π y .
Some Lower Bounds
It is easy to see that when both senders x () and destinations y () use oracle-based implementations, our resulting algorithm has an optimal best-case cost in terms of inter-group messages: no algorithm can solve Reliable Broadcast without exchanging at least one message between groups.
We informally argue now that if either senders x () or destinations y () (but not both) has an oracle-based implementation, our resulting algorithms also have optimal best-case costs. The argument is similar for both situations, and so, assume that senders x () has an implementation that uses oracles. What we want to show is that the inter-group message cost of our algorithm, namely f y +1, is a lower bound for algorithms where the sending group does not have information about failures in the receiving group. In the best case, a correct process p i in Π x is selected to send messages to processes in Π y . Assume for a contradiction that p i sends only f y messages.
Consider a run where each process in Π y that receives a message fails right after receiving the message; the remaining processes in Π y will then never receive the message, and therefore, cannot deliver it.
In a purely asynchronous system (when neither the implementation of senders x () nor the implementation of destinations y () use oracles), our algorithm has inter-group message cost of (f x + 1)(f y + 1), which is not optimal. Consider, for example, the special case when both n x and n y are greater than f x + f y . In this case, the following algorithms solves domain-based Reliable Broadcast: the first f x + f y + 1 processes in Π x send one message to the first f x + f y + 1 processes in Π y . The resulting message cost is f x + f y + 1. Moreover, from Proposition 1, it turns out that this algorithm is optimal.
Proposition 1 Let A be a reliable broadcast algorithm in which processes do not query any oracle. For every run of A in which a correct process in Π x byz-broadcasts some message, at least f x + f y + 1 messages are sent from Π x to Π y .
Proof:
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that processes in Π x send only f x + f y messages to Π y . Let R be a failure-free run in which p i in Π x byz-broadcasts message m and S the set of processes that send messages to Π y in R.
We claim that there exists a run R in which p i also byz-broadcasts m, each process in S x ⊆ S crashes, and no process sends more messages in R than it sends in R. Let p j be a process in S x that crashes at time t j and p k some process that sends one more message in R at time t > t j . Then, we can construct a run R j such that from time t j until time t, p j is very slow and does not execute any steps, and so, does not send any message-this can be done since processes can be arbitrarily delayed. Process p k cannot distinguish between R j and R j , and will also send a message to Π y in R j . After t, p j is back to normal and sends a message to Π y . Thus, f x + f y + 1 messages are sent to Π y , a contradiction.
We now show that |S| > f x . Assume |S| ≤ f x . Then, we can construct a run in which S x = S, every p j in S x crashes and from our claim above, no other process in Π x \ S sends a message to processes in Π y . Thus, correct processes in Π x deliver m, and processes in Π y never receive m, and so, cannot deliver it.
Without loss of generality assume that each process in S x sends only one message to Π y . Thus, processes in S \ S x can send up to f x + f y − |S x | = f y messages to processes in Π y . Let set S y denote such processes in Π y . Since any f y processes may crash in Π y , assume that processes in S y crash in R . Therefore, in R correct processes in Π x deliver m, but correct processes in Π y do not, a contradiction.
2 Even when n x or n y are smaller than f x +f y +1, our algorithm, which exchanges (f x +1)(f y +1) messages is not optimal. Consider the following case in which n x = n y = 4 and f x = f y = 2. With our algorithm, processes in Π x will send 9 messages to processes in Π y . While this is certainly enough to guarantee correctness, it is possible to do better: instead of sending to three distinct processes in Π y , each process p x i sends a message to processes p for all m ∈ mset \ rcvM sgs do byz-deliver(m) r-broadcast(mset) Algorithm 3 builds on Algorithm 2. It works as follows. In order for some process in a good group to byz-deliver a message, it has to r-deliver it (i.e., using local Reliable Broadcast). This guarantees that all correct processes in the group will r-deliver the message. Using a mechanism similar to the one used in Algorithm 2, the message will eventually reach some correct process in each good group, which will r-broadcast the message locally, and also propagate it to other groups. In principle, the inter-group communication of Algorithm 3 is similar to the Reliable Broadcast algorithm presented in [CT96] , for a "flat" process model.
A Reliable Broadcast Algorithm with Consistency
We now extend Algorithm 3 to also enforce the consistency property. Algorithm 4 resembles Algorithm 3. The main differences are the first when clause, the fact that all messages are signed to guarantee authenticity, and the fact that the local Reliable Broadcast requires the consistency property.
Local Reliable Broadcast with the consistency property can be implemented with an algorithm similar, in principle, to Algorithm 4. To r-broadcast some message m, p i in Π x signs m and sends it to all processes in Π x (we use mset : k i to denote that the message set mset is signed by p i ). When a process p j receives m for the first time, it also signs m and sends it to all processes in Π x . If a process receives m from (2n + 1)/3 processes, it r-delivers m. (A detailed description of this algorithm is given in the Appendix.) Proof: Follows from the fact that the destinations x () abstraction, the send primitive, and the fork operation are all non-blocking.
2
Proposition 3 (Validity.) If a correct process in Π y invokes send x () with a message m then eventually a correct process in Π x can receive m by invoking receive x ().
Proof: Assume that a correct process p i in Π y invokes send x () with a message m. There are now two cases to consider: (a) the dest set in line 3 contains a correct process p j or (b) the dest set does not contain a correct process. With case (a), p i will send m to p j . By the properties of the send and receive primitives, p j can eventually receive m. Consider now case (b). By the Validity property of destinations x (), the destinations x () abstraction eventually returns a correct process p j in Π x . Since p j is not contained in dest initially, there is an invocation of destinations x () that returns p j and where the test in line 7 becomes true. In this iteration of the while loop, p i will send [GS,m] to p j . The Proposition then follows from the properties of the send and receive primitives as above in case (a). Proof: Since p i byz-broadcasts m, it r-broadcasts m. From validity of reliable broadcast, it eventually r-delivers some message mset such that m ∈ mset. Assume for the sake of a contradiction that p i does not byz-deliver m. So, it must be that p i has included m in rcvM sgs, but when this happens, p i byz-delivers m, a contradiction that concludes the proof. 2
Proposition 6 (Agreement.) If a correct process p i in a good group Π x byz-delivers m, then for every good group Π y and each correct process p j in Π y , p j also byz-delivers m.
Proof: Assume for a contradiction that p j does not byz-deliver m. There are two cases to consider: (a) p j and p i are in the same group or (b) p j and p i are in different groups.
• Case (a). Since p i has byz-delivered m, by lines 6-7, p i has r-delivered m. From agreement of reliable broadcast, eventually p j also r-delivers m. Since p j does not byz-deliver m, m must already be part of the set rcvM sgs. Consider the execution of the when clause in line 6 when m is added to rcvM sgs. In this execution, p j byz-delivers m, which is a contradiction.
• Case (b). There is a time t after which the senders x () abstraction returns the same set of correct processes for every invocation. Consider a correct process p r in Π x that is part of this set. There are two subcases to consider: (b.1) p r invokes the send x () abstraction with m in line 10 and (b.2) p r does not invoke the send x () abstraction with m in line 10.
Consider first case (b.1). The properties of send x () and receive x () ensure that a correct process p k in Π y can receive m with receive x (). When p k receives m, p k sends m to all processes in Π y including p j . Because both p k and p j are correct, the properties of send and receive ensure that p j will receive m. When p j receives m, p j also byz-delivers m, which is a contradiction.
Consider next case (b.2). The set rcvM sgs r \f wdM sgs r never contains m after t. Because of the agreement of Local Reliable Broadcast, p r will eventually r-deliver m and add it to rcvM sgs r . Thus, the set f wdM sgs r contains m before t. However, we only add to the set f wdM sgs r in line 11, and when m is added to the set in line 11, p r invoked send x () with m in line 10, which is a contradiction.
2
Proposition 7 (Integrity.) Each honest process p i byz-delivers every message at most once. Moreover, if sender(m) is honest, then sender(m) byz-broadcast m.
Proof: There are two cases to consider: (a) p i and sender(m) are in the same group and (b) p i and sender(m) are in different groups.
• Case (a). If p i is in the same group as sender(m), then p i byz-delivers m in line 7. Thus, p i also r-delivers m. Integrity of Local Reliable Broadcast implies that sender(m) r-broadcasts m. According to the algorithm, this only happens if sender(m) byz-broadcasts m. The at-most-once byz-delivery by p i follows from the assignment in line 8: if p i byz-delivers m, then the assignment adds m to rcvM sgs.
• Case (b). If p i is in a different group than sender(m), then p i byz-delivers m in line 15. Thus, p i also receives [LC,m] . Integrity of send and receive guarantees that some process p r sent [LC,m] in line 13. Moreover, the integrity of send x () and receive x () ensures that some process p k in Π x invoked send x () with m. This means that p k added m to its rcvM sgs set, which only happens if p k r-delivers m. The integrity of Local Reliable Broadcast now ensures that some process p m in Π x invoked byz-broadcast with m. The at-most-once byz-delivery follows from the integrity of the various primitives and abstractions and from the assignment in line 11, which ensures that a process never invokes send x () twice with the same message. 
